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11 Introduction
The most important factor in‡uencingpeoples’ timing of daily activities might be howothers
time their activities. It is, for instance, reasonableto believethat spouses want tosynchronize
their individual timing of marketwork andleisureso thatthey canspend more timetogether.
Naturally, individuals and households would maximize utility with respect to synchronized
leisure consumption, because spending time together is central for making relationships and
families work. We would believe that subjects of rejoice and distress, but also work e¤ort
in ordinary household duties and enjoyment of leisure activities, involve elements of timing.
The coordination and timing of work e¤ort is also important, and sometimes essential, in
many workplaces.
The interaction between household members and how they optimize their joint time-use
(e.g. the labor supply of spouses) has been and still is a subject for economic research (see
Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986, for a survey on female labor supply). However, while
the traditional time allocation model typically studies the total time spent in, e.g., market
work, over a day or a week, it provides little or no insight into the temporal pattern of time-
use and therefore, potentially, misses a vital part of the mechanisms underlying empirical
observations. The total time spent inleisure (or market work) may not bethe (only) relevant
choice for individuals. If couples seek to enjoy more time together and therefore interact to
synchronize the timing of work and leisure, it seems more relevant to analyze the temporal
pattern of time-use than to just analyze the total time spent in market work and leisure
during a day or a week.
This study is important for a number of reasons. Depending on whether parents with
small children choose to have synchronous working schedules, they will have di¤erent de-
mands for public child care. Neglecting the timing aspect of time-use and the interaction
between spouses may cause biased estimates of the economic incentives for labor supply and
when it is performed. Heterogeneity between spouses and between households in working
schedule arrangements and restrictions in choosing the optimal work schedule are normally
not part of the traditional time allocation model. This should a¤ect our conception of wel-
2fare, if we think it depends on the extent to which members in a society can interact.1
Few (economic) studies have examined the temporal choice of time-use, and time budget
data sets are underutilized in this respect.2 Among the exceptions are Hamermesh (1998,
1999, 2000), who studied the contemporaneous leisure of spouses and whether they choose
working hours in order to enjoy more synchronous leisure. One …nding was that work
schedules of husbands and wives were in fact interdependent during most hours of the day.
If one spouse was at work at a speci…c hour, the other was more likely to be so than
not. He also found that couples with higher earnings (holding total market work hours
constant) consume more synchronous leisure. This implies that synchronous leisure might
be considered a normal good. Hamermesh (1999) argued that the decline in work at odd
hours between the 1970s and the 1990s in the US did not depend on an industrial shift or
changes in demography. This pattern might well be explained by the fact that workers are
economically better o¤ and therefore need not choose inconvenient working hours. Velzen
(2001) studied the timing aspects of work and leisure of Dutch two-earner households and
her main…ndings matchthose ofHamermesh (2000). Onaverage, Dutchhusbands and wives
mostly tend to work and enjoy leisure at the same time of the day, and more so if household
work was included in the de…nition of work and leisure was analyzed as a separate category.
An interesting result can be found in Rydenstam and Wadeskog (1995), suggesting that
1 It is characteristic of the Swedish labor market that men in general have better possibilities to organize
their working time than women and that men’s power to alter working hours increase with age, while no
such pattern was found for women (SCB, 1999). 37 percent and 46 percent of the working men and working
women, respectively, stated that they could not vary their working schedule. The survey (SCB, 1999) also
showed that working nights was more common among women than men and about uniformly distributed
over di¤erent age-groups, while men more frequently took up shift work than women. Shift work tended to
decrease with age, and it was, therefore, mainly men below their 50s that worked in shifts. At the same
time, it seems that men had a slightly more unregulated working schedule as compared to women; 9 percent
(5 percent) of all males (females) reported that they work overtime every day and 24 percent (28 percent)
of the males (females) reported that they rarely work overtime.
2 Issues of instantaneous timing have been discussed in sociology (see, e.g., Sullivan, 1996, for some
empirical work on the evaluation of activities undertaken alone or with someone else). For an early discussion
on collective rhythms in a family context, see Moore (1963). Kooreman and Wunderink (1996) suggested
arguments against a collective rhythm. More ‡exible time schedules allow individuals time sovereignty and
a more e¢ciency use of time and space.
3unoccupied time away from market work was more fragmentary for women as compared to
men. An interpretation would be that the time allocation of women is more interconnected,
and partly directed by, the demands of household work. While men enjoy their leisure in
long sequences without interruption, women enjoy theirs in shorter fragments.
Hallberg and Klevmarken (2002) suggested that Swedish families where both parents
work seem to have a tight schedule. Parents were more likely to cut down on their own
private time than reducing the time with their children. However, the need to provide child
care (at home) may not only lead a couple to alter their total supply of labor but also the
timing of market work and leisure, thus potentially a¤ecting spouses possibilities to enjoy
synchronously leisure. Hamermesh (2000) suggested that having new children implied a
reduction in synchronous leisure and that the impact was greatest among …rst-time parents.
New mothers also changed their working schedules the most as compared to other groups.
Velzen (2001) also found that the presence of fairly young children had a negative impact
on the degree of synchronization of work and leisure schedules.
This paper o¤ers empirical evidencefor Sweden onthe temporal patternof various activi-
ties, including when market work is performed, andon the nature ofsynchronous leisure con-
sumption. Hamermesh’s(2000)hypothesis was thatspouses adjustedtheir workingschedules
in order to enjoy more synchronized leisure. The traditional time allocation model is there-
fore usually incorrect, since it does not take the temporal aspect of time-use into account.
It is, however, problematic to test this hypothesis just by studying the correlation in the
timing of activities of spouses. The problem arises since we do not know to what extent the
observed outcome in timing is a result of the proposed timing adjustment or an e¤ect of the
general organization in society, respectively. There are, for example, social and biological
rhythms of daily life of society that are important for the timing of most people.3
The contributions of this paper are twofold. I test the synchronization hypothesis sug-
gested by Hamermesh (2000) by creating a control group of pseudo couples, consisting of
3 Strong indications of this are that most of us prefer to sleep during the night, work in daytime, and
that we prefer to have our meals at certain times, etc. Furthermore, most job contracts only allow a limited
choice of working hours and temporal scope.
4single men and single women statistically matched together to a household unit. The as-
sumption is that the activity timing of pseudo couples is a¤ected in the same way by the
general organizationof society as the timing of real couples. However, the single manandthe
single woman in a pseudo couple are completely ignorant of each other’s timing. The timing
of pseudo couples is assumed to represent the contra factual, if couples did not synchronize
activities timing within the household. By comparing the timing of matched real couples
with that of matched pseudo couples, we can remove e¤ects not caused by the proposed
timing adjustment, i.e., by the organization of society in general. This is new as compared
to the studies by Hamermesh (2000) and Velzen (2001).
In addition, I study how total joint leisure, i.e., the actual time that spouses meet, varies
with the economic and demographic factors of the household and, to some extent, with labor
market characteristics. Data for the present study are taken from the 1984 and 1993 waves
of the Household Market and Nonmarket Activities (HUS). The time-use surveys contain
supplementary information on the presence of other household members, e.g., the spouse,
which enables us to distinguish between simultaneous time-use of spouses and when spouses
actually meet. Knowing whether the spouse is involved with the respondent in an activity
supplies additional information along a dimension not previously explored, e.g., issues of
intra-household work burden and the cooperation of spouses. (This is also newas compared
to earlier studies by Hamermesh (2000) and Velzen (2001).) I therefore distinguish between
synchronized leisure and joint leisure to signify that leisure can be consumed simultaneously
but not necessarily jointly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next, a theoretical model of temporal time
allocation is discussed and compared to a traditional model of time allocation. Section 3
contains a presentation of the data used. To assess the e¤ect of spouses’ coordination of
work timing and test the hypothesis that couples adjust the timing of activities, I perform a
matching experiment with singles. Section 4 presents the results from this experiment along
with empirical evidence on the timing dependence of various activities including market
work. In Section 5, I investigate to what extent couples are together and how this varies
5with the economic and demographic factors of the household. Finally, Section 6 gives a
summary of the paper and concludes.
2 A temporal framework of time allocation
Let us assume thata couplehas preferences over private andjoint leisure (i.e. togetherness).4
I expect the valuation of time alone and time together with the spouse to depend on the
nature of and to what end various activities are performed. It is, for instance, plausible
to assume that most spouses want to enjoy recreational activities together, while certain
household activities are preferably done alone. However, to maintain simplicity in the the-
oretical framework below, I will assume that a person performs either work or leisure. In
this framework, it is also assumed that if spouses consume leisure at the same time, they
are together.
The allocation problem of the household is formulated as an intertemporal problem over
a sequence of small indivisible time periods. The household consists of a husband (m) and
a wife (f). Let the total time endowment (a day or a week) be T, which is divided into
small, equally spaced and indivisible time periods denoted by t: Each t = 1;:::;T can, for









where x is the household’s consumption of market goods,6 lst is any type of leisure, and lJ
t
is jointly consumed leisure, s = m;f. Here, lst and lJ
t are dichotomous variables, equalling
4 This section relies heavily on Hamermesh (2000).
5 The maximand of the household is assumed to be well-behaved; real-valued, continuous and quasi-
concave.
6 x is the aggregate (over household members and time intervals) consumption of market goods of the
household and I assume that the Hicksian composite commodity theorem holds. Hence, a well-behaved
reduced-form utility function can be de…ned as in (1), which (subject to constraints below) yields the same
solution as maximizing a utility function with individual consumption of x as arguments.
6one if leisure of a speci…c type is consumed at hour t; and zero otherwise.7
Private and joint leisure are de…ned as, respectively,
l
P
st = (1¡ lut)lst;s;u = m;f;u 6= s; (2)
l
J
t = lmtlft: (3)
Private and joint leisure are hence functions of the underlying choice variables lst; s = m;f;
t = 1;:::;T.





(1¡ lst)wst = x, (4)
where wst is the exogenously given marginal net wage-rate at t for spouse s = m;f, and the
price of market goods is set to 1. Discounting is ignored. Like Hamermesh (1999, 2000),
it is assumed that wst is exogenously determined on the market and may vary over t; since
the demand and supply conditions of labor may vary over t. In this model, the usual time
constraint is always satis…ed since lst is a dichotomous variable, s = m;f; t = 1;:::;T.
The maximization of (1) subject to (4) leads to the couple’s optimal choice of market
goods x and leisure sequences flsg = ls1;:::;lsT; s = m;f: From (2) and (3), the optimal
sequences of private and joint leisure can be constructed. The total (e.g. daily) demand for
leisure (of each type) is found by summing the elements in these sequences over t.
Spouse s will work at t if wst > w¤
st; where w¤
st is his or her reservation wage at t. The
reservation wage may vary over t and s and will be determined by the (possible mutual)
preference for enjoying leisure together verses enjoying it alone, and by the preference to
consume market goods.
Spouses’ timing of leisure and work need not be separable. One or several arguments
in ZJ will be positive if spouses’ leisure is consumed jointly, but if a couple is indi¤erent
about consuming leisure jointly, ZJ [¢] can be omitted from (1). A couple has a preference
7 Followingthe household production literature, ZJ may be regarded as the output from home production.
7for being at home simultaneously (and thus being together) if the production of ZJ yields
additional utility, i.e., if @U
@ZJ > 0 (or, alternatively, the couple might have a preference for
asynchronous leisure, i.e. @U
@ZJ < 0). If this is the case, the timing of the spouses’ leisure is
not separable in utility since, in order to maximize utility, spouses seek coordination of work
and leisure schedules.
The empirical implication of this model is that a preference for simultaneous leisure leads
to interdependence between the timing of market work and leisure within the household,
given the total supply of market work.
In a traditional time allocation model, it is assumed that the Hicksian composite com-
modity theorem holds for theaggregate over T and that the utility is maximizedwith respect
to the aggregate. Aggregation can therefore be misleadingifthe utility functionis not weakly
separable over t, i.e. if the timing of leisure consumption is of importance.8
3 Data
Inthis section, Idescribe thedatausedfor this study. Thedataare taken from theHousehold
Market and Nonmarket Activities (HUS).9 The 1984 and 1993 waves of data collection
included time-use surveys. For each respondent, a time-use diary was collected by telephone
for two randomly selected days, normally a weekday (Mon.-Fri.) and a weekend day (Sat.-
Sun.). In most households with two spouses, both were interviewed concerning the same
designated days. No …xed format was used either for time slots or for activities, the smallest
time interval being 1 minute. The respondent’s own words were recorded by the interviewer
and later activity coded.
8 The traditional model may, however, be correct if Hicksian separability holds, i.e., the price vector
ws=fws1;:::;wsTg for s = m;f; is always proportional across households to some …xed base price vector
w0
s; so that ws = csw0
s for some scalar cs. This means that, for instance, overtime payment arrangements
cannot di¤er across households. All households must, in relation to their earnings for working at hour a
(0 · a · T); have the same earnings for working at t: Whether this is a plausible assumption is seldom
empirically tested, however, presumably since detailed institutional wage data that contain information on
each individual’s wage-rate for all t rarely are available.
9 See Klevmarken & Olovsson (1993) and Flood, Klevmarken & Olovsson (1996).
8The sample used in this paper is restricted to cohabiting spouses, aged 18 or more,
where both spouses reported in the main interview that they were employed.10 ;11 Most
respondents participated both on a weekday (Mon.-Fri.) and on a weekend day (Sat.-Sun.).
However, market work is unusual on Saturdays and Sundays. Consequently, there will be
little variation in data depending on market work timing during weekend days. I therefore
excluded weekend day responses (i.e. Saturdays and Sundays). These restrictions give a
sample of a total of 511 (516) two-earner households/time-use interviews in 1984 (1993).
Only information on primary activities was used.
I classify the activities according to the following list:
² Householdwork (H)– Activeandpassivechild-care, care of sick child. Preparingmeals,
doing the dishes, cleaning, washing, ironing and household management. Repair and
maintenance of own home and vacation home, yard work. Repair and maintenance of
motor vehicle, boat. Taking care of sick adult or animal. Purchases of everyday goods
and clothing, consumer durables, private services and public services.
² Leisure (L) – Meals, studies, church and organizational activities, sport activities etc.,
TV, radio, hobbies, reading, telephone calls, conversations etc. Purchases of private
and public health and medical care and dental care.
² Sleep and rest (S) – Sleeping and resting, personal hygiene, changing clothes etc.
² Market work (N) – Gainful employment including lunch and co¤ee breaks, o¢cial
job-related travels, applying for work and military service.
Travelingtimeinconnectionwiththe activity was includedforall activities. The time-use
data were merged with additional information from the main survey regarding the respon-
dent’s employment status and economic and demographic background.
10 Households with two cohabiting adults of the same sex were excluded from the sample.
11 A person who has been on leave from work (e.g. parental leave to take care of a child) longer than 8
weeks is coded as unemployed (not in the labor force).
9Besides the information on the total time that each respondent spent in each of these
activities during a day, I de…ned a set of dummy variables (one for each type of activity
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> > > :
1 if spouse s = m;f performed activity k = H;L;S;N
during minute t;
0 else.
3.1 Sample characteristics of the temporal pattern of time-use
The top row of Figure 1 provides a cross gender and year comparison of the fraction of
workers engaged in market work at di¤erent times of the day during Monday-Friday. Most
market work is performed in daytime. A working day normally starts at 7 or 8 a.m. and
lasts until 4 or 5 p.m. The fractions at work fall rapidly for both men and women after 4
p.m., and during evenings and nights only few people work in the market. A larger fraction
of men as compared to women are at work at any hour of the day, which is what should
be expected since, on average, men have longer working days and work full-time to a larger
extent than women. There are more women at work in the 1990s as compared to the 1980s,
which is expected considering the rise in female working hours in this period.
A decomposition into the di¤erent nonmarket activities is shown in the bottom row of
Figure 1 and in Figure 2. The pattern is as could be expected. Leisure and household work
activities increase at around 6 a.m., which is right before most people go to work. There is
also a temporary peak of leisure and household work at noon. At 4 p.m., men and women
increasingly engage in leisure activities. This increase continues until 9.30 p.m. Thereafter,
at 10 p.m. or so, sleep becomes the dominating activity. The fractions of men and women
doing some sort of household work also increase at 4 p.m., i.e., the hour after which most
people arrive home from work, but falls again in the evening hours. On average, men and
women go to bed at around 10 p.m. and sleep until 6 a.m. or 7 a.m. We can note a small
increase in the fraction that sleeps or rests at around 5 p.m.
Not unexpectedly, we can detect some marked di¤erences in the temporal time-use be-
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Figure 1: Fractions in market work (top row) and household work including child care
(bottom row), by hour after midnight, men (right) and women (left), two-earner households,
Mon.-Fri.
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Figure 2: Fractions in leisure (top row) and sleep and rest (bottom row), by hour after
midnight, men (right) and women (left), two-earner households, Mon.-Fri.
12tween men and women. A larger fraction of women engage in household work activities as
compared to men, both in the evening of a typical working day and in daytime. This, and
the fact that women perform more leisure in daytime, once more indicates that woman more
often than men work part of the day and part of the week. In the evenings, women engage
in leisure at about the same frequency as men but engage more than men in household work.
Even though the activity de…nition used is quite broad, one possible interpretation is that
the time-use of women is more fragmentary as compared to that of men.
The fraction of womenworking in the market is, as we noted earlier, lower as comparedto
menat all hours. However, onaverage, womenseem to work atabout thesame hours as men,
i.e. between 7 a.m. and 4 p.m. The fraction carrying out market work falls less dramatically
and somewhat earlier in the afternoon for women, which is an impact of women’s shorter
working days, although they start at about the same hour in the morning. This pattern is
about the same for women in both 1984 and 1993.
There are also some di¤erences across years for women. As compared to the 1980s, we
see that the higher frequency of market work in the 1990s is combined with less household
work, both in the evenings and in daytime (i.e., when market work is frequently performed).
4 Testing for intra-household timing adjustment
In this section, we will test the timing adjustment hypothesis suggested by Hamermesh
(2000) by creating a control group of pseudo couples, consisting of single men and single
women matched together to a household unit. Pseudo couples are obtained by statistically
matching single men and single women into pseudo households similar to observed two-
earner households, the behavior of which can be compared to that of true couples (details
about the matching can be found in Appendix). The assumption is that the activity timing
of pseudo couples is a¤ected by the general organization of society in the same way as the
timing of real couples. However, the single man and the single woman in a pseudo couple
are completely ignorant of the each other’s timing. Hence, by comparing the timing of real
couples with that of matched pseudo couples, we should be able to remove e¤ects that are
13not caused by the proposed timing adjustment, i.e., the e¤ect of the general organization of
society.
The hypothesis is the following. If couples adjust their working schedules in order to
enjoy more synchronous leisure, this should appear in the data by a higher correlation in
the timing and more simultaneous leisure and household work among matched true couples
than among matched pseudo couples, given the total supply of market work.
The aim of the matching is to generate two matched samples in addition to the original
sample of couples:
1. Acontrol groupof pseudocouples, consistingofsingle males andsingle femalesmatched
together to a household unit.
2. The treatment group of true couples, which is de…ned by matches to pseudo couples.
To generate the desired treatment group and control group, I employ a non-standard
way of matching. Usually when statistical matching is done, a treated unit belonging to a
relatively small pool of treated is statistically matched on the basis of a set of observable
covariates (matching variables) with a control unit belonging to a relatively large pool of
nontreated. The present situation is di¤erent in two ways. First, to compare couples that
adjust their timing with couples that do not (pseudo couples), we need to generate a set of
pseudo couples out of singles. Second, since the sample size of singles (of each gender) is
about one …fth as compared to that of couples, the strategy is to match couples to singles, i.e.
a control unit is matchedto a treatedunit. Thetraditional approachis to dothe opposite. In
1984, there were 103 (109) single males (single females) who reported in the main interview
that they were employed and for whom we have a weekday (Mon.-Fri.) response. In 1993,
the corresponding sample sizes were 170 (163) single males (single females).12
The matching algorithm employed here simultaneously matches a single male to a single
woman with a pseudo couple and this pseudo couple to a real couple (”double matching”).
12 The sample of singles is taken from the same database as the original sample of couples presented so
far.
14The matching criterion is based upon the nearest available pair matching, using the Maha-
lanobis metric to de…ne distance with respect to a set of matching variables. The matching
algorithm follows Rubin (1979). (Details can be found in the Appendix.) Matching was
made without replacement and separately for each year, which resulted in 103 (163) couples
in 1984 (1993) in the control group and the treatment group, respectively.
It is important to consider howmatching is done, since singles and individuals living as a
couple di¤er inmany ways. By comparingtheoutcomes forthe treatmentgroupwiththose in
the control group, I hold constant for the matching variables used. It is of particular interest
that the treated and non-treated work about the same amount of hours in the market since
we compare the timing dependence and the degree of synchronization. I therefore include
total hours of market work on the day of the interview (MW) among the matching variables.
Households (which areincludedin thematching) may therefore vary in their choices of timing
of work over the day, but not in the total hours worked. Studies by Hamermesh (2000) and
Velzen (2001) found that the presence of fairly young children had a negative impact on the
degree of synchronization of work and leisure schedules. To avoid that outcomes depend on
age and family structure, I included the age of the respondent and the number of children
in the household in age brackets 0-2, 3-6, 7-12 and 13-18 among the matching variables. I
also included the number of years of schooling. Both education and seniority (i.e. service
length with the same employer) serve as proxies for the individual situation on the labor
market. Seniority is partly captured by the age of the respondent, which is already included.
It is possible that profession is important in explaining the individual in‡uence over working
schedules. However, due to the rather small sample size, I only include an indicator variable
for self-employment.
I present summary statistics for the original sample of couples and the sample of singles
in Tables 1, 2 and 3.13 Couples are, on average, older, have more children of all ages and
are self-employed to a greater extent than singles. There are also di¤erences in the working
13 I only present summary statistics for those singles that were matched (i.e. the pseudo couples), and
not for all singles used in the matching procedure, since the number of single males and single females was
almost equal each year.
15Table 1: Summary statistics, all couples
1984, N=511 1993, N=516
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
agem 42.793 10.473 20.000 70.000 44.986 10.603 21.000 78.000
agef 40.094 10.244 18.000 64.000 42.564 10.582 20.000 75.000
#children 0-2 0.080 0.279 0.000 2.000 0.095 0.293 0.000 1.000
#children 3-6 0.241 0.515 0.000 3.000 0.205 0.491 0.000 2.000
#children 7-12 0.399 0.643 0.000 3.000 0.318 0.626 0.000 3.000
#children 13-18 0.432 0.671 0.000 3.000 0.341 0.620 0.000 3.000
schoolingm 11.170 3.683 6.000 30.000 12.068 3.356 6.000 25.000
schoolingf 10.879 3.129 6.000 25.000 12.163 3.190 6.000 27.000
self employedm 0.192 0.000 1.000 0.161 0.000 1.000
self employedf 0.067 0.000 1.000 0.076 0.000 1.000
MWm 8.108 4.699 0.000 24.000 7.894 4.230 0.000 18.167
MWf 5.080 4.194 0.000 15.167 5.699 4.305 0.000 18.750
hours depending on cohabiting status. Single women (men) work more (less) hours on the
market as compared to women (men) in a couple.
A comparison of the matched samples gives some idea of how successful the matching
algorithmis. Compositional di¤erences betweencontrol andtreatment groups after matching
are not desirable, since they may to some extent contribute to di¤erences in outcome. By
comparing summary statistics for controls and treated, in Tables 2 and 3 for 1984 and 1993,
respectively, we note that the matching algorithm has generated matched samples that are
quite similar with respect to most matching variables.14 We note for instance that there is
exactly the same number of self-employed in the two groups and that most other variables do
not di¤er a great deal in the mean. Some dissimilarities between the treatment and control
groups remain, however, especially for 1993. Husbands inthe treatment group are older than
matched single males and couples belonging to the treatment group have fewer children in
the age bracket 13-18 than matched single women. Wives in the treatment group work
somewhat less than matched single women, which is fairly problematic since this di¤erence
14 Obviously, for …nite sample sizes, matching variables are likely to di¤er between units for at least some
of the matches.
16Table 2: Summary statistics for matched samples 1984
N=103 Pseudo couples Subset of matched real couples
(control group) (treatment group)
Variable Mean Std.Dev Min Max Mean Std.Dev Min Max
agem 35.408 13.003 19.000 74.000 38.689 11.962 20.000 70.000
agef 36.825 13.802 19.000 64.000 36.485 12.578 18.000 64.000
#children 0-2m 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
#children 0-2f 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
#children 0-2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
#children 3-6m 0.039 0.277 0.000 2.000
#children 3-6f 0.049 0.216 0.000 1.000
#children 3-6 0.049 0.216 0.000 1.000
#children 7-12m 0.097 0.329 0.000 2.000
#children 7-12f 0.136 0.397 0.000 2.000
#children 7-12 0.117 0.351 0.000 2.000
#children 13-18m 0.165 0.487 0.000 3.000
#children 13-18f 0.243 0.494 0.000 2.000
#children 13-18 0.155 0.414 0.000 2.000
schoolingm 10.806 3.042 6.000 25.000 11.058 2.967 6.000 20.000
schoolingf 11.136 2.914 6.000 20.000 11.233 2.773 6.000 20.000
self employedm 0.146 0.000 1.000 0.146 0.000 1.000
self employedf 0.049 0.000 1.000 0.049 0.000 1.000
MWm 7.541 4.953 0.000 24.000 7.619 4.931 0.000 19.083
MWf 6.363 3.997 0.000 13.917 6.077 4.106 0.000 12.250
17Table 3: Summary statistics for matched samples 1993
N=163 Pseudo couples Subset of matched real couples
(control group) (treatment group)
Variable Mean Std.Dev Min Max Mean Std.Dev Min Max
agem 37.258 12.763 19.000 64.000 41.607 11.475 21.000 76.000
agef 39.405 14.368 19.000 89.000 39.926 12.227 20.000 75.000
#children 0-2m 0.018 0.135 0.000 1.000
#children 0-2f 0.018 0.135 0.000 1.000
#children 0-2 0.012 0.110 0.000 1.000
#children 3-6m 0.025 0.155 0.000 1.000
#children 3-6f 0.067 0.252 0.000 1.000
#children 3-6 0.049 0.217 0.000 1.000
#children 7-12m 0.055 0.278 0.000 2.000
#children 7-12f 0.129 0.418 0.000 2.000
#children 7-12 0.080 0.314 0.000 2.000
#children 13-18m 0.147 0.434 0.000 3.000
#children 13-18f 0.276 0.601 0.000 3.000
#children 13-18 0.190 0.479 0.000 2.000
schoolingm 11.982 2.918 7.000 22.000 11.736 2.629 7.000 20.000
schoolingf 12.147 3.009 5.000 20.000 11.951 2.733 6.000 20.000
self employedm 0.141 0.000 1.000 0.141 0.000 1.000
self employedf 0.031 0.000 1.000 0.031 0.000 1.000
MWm 6.535 4.926 0.000 17.333 6.792 4.672 0.000 16.450
MWf 6.149 4.246 0.000 14.750 5.607 4.313 0.000 12.500
18may very well result in more synchronous leisure among the treated.
Next, in Section 4.1, I will examine the timing dependence between spouses and make
comparisons across the threesamples. InSection4.2, Iwill study theoutcome in synchronous
leisure and household work for the groups of treated and nontreated.
4.1 Independence test
The choices of the husband and the wife whether to perform activity k during t result in a







where the upper left cell represents a household where neither of the spouses was active,
the upper right cell represents a household where the wife was active but the husband was
not, etc. If lk
mt and lk
ft are independent, so is the timing of the spouses. This is tested using
Pearson’s ￿2-test of independence. The test is performed separately for the original sample
of all couples, the subset of matched couples (the treatment group) andthe sample of pseudo
couples (the control group), by hour, activity, and year.
The original indicator variables were de…ned for each minute (see Section 3). Instead
of testing independence for each of the 1440 minutes in a day, I have chosen to aggregate
the original indicator variables to hours and test for independence for each of the 24 hours.
For a speci…c hour and activity, the hourly dummy variable is coded as 1 if the activity was
performed within that hour, and 0 if not. This coding has its drawbacks, since it disregards
both the duration and the placement of a particular activity within a speci…c hour. In some
cases, we might hence incorrectly think that a husbandand awife were active simultaneously
when, in fact, they were not.15
15 This would happen if, for instance, one spouse performed a speci…c activity during the …rst 30 minutes
of the hour and the other spouse during the second 30 minutes of the same hour. The de…nition of these
hourly dummies is not exclusive, since a respondent can be recorded as doing more than one activity during
the same hour.
19To save space, I will only present the estimated p-value of each test. As for the sample
of all couples, the results indicate that the dependence in instantaneous timing between
spouses is signi…cant and positive for most hours and most activities, see Table 4. We note
that independence in market work timing cannot be rejected during nights and evenings.
This may be a result of too little variation at those hours. However, during the time when
most market work is performed (between 6 a.m. and 3 p.m.), the results suggest that
instantaneous timing in market work is strongly dependent. Whether one of the spouses
performs market work at t provides information about whether the other spouse is doing
it too. Spouses organize the timing of leisure activities such that they are enjoyed at the
same time. The null of independence is rejected at the 5 percent level for all hours in 1984
and most hours in 1993. Timing dependence is less frequent in household work and sleep
as compared to leisure. For 1984, independent timing of household work is rejected during
afternoons and evenings, but not in the mornings. The timing of sleep is independent in the
afternoon but not otherwise. The results are similar for 1993.
The corresponding tests of independence are shown in Table 5 for the treatment group
(thesubset of matchedcouples). In1993, thepatterns ofdependencefor the various activities
are similar to those of the full sample of couples. The timing of market work is not made
independently of spouses for the greater part of the hours when work usually is performed.
In 1984, however, we cannot reject the hypothesis that timing of market work is independent
during the same hours.
The main result is, however, that the instantaneous timing is frequently independent for
the nontreated (i.e. the pseudo couples), as shown in Table 6. Occasionally, the null can
also be rejected for pseudo couples, but those instances are few and occur at unusual hours.
This result is quite interesting since individuals in both groups are very similar in many
ways, including their hours of market work on the day of the interview. We hence …nd that
real couples coordinate their activities to a major extent, while singles assigned into pseudo
households do not. In leisure, and to some extent in household work, the conclusion is that
one spouse’s timing is of great importance for that of the other.
20Table 4: P-values from Pearson’s test of independence in spouses’ instantaneous timing of
market work (N), household work (H), leisure (L), and sleep (S). (All two-earner households,
Mo.-Fri.)
N H L S
Hour after
midnight
1984 1993 1984 1993 1984 1993 1984 1993
0 0.542¡ 0.097+ 0.929¡ 0.878¡ 0.000+ 0.291+ 0.000+ 0.446¡
1 0.542¡ 0.801¡ i i 0.000+ 0.843¡ 0.000+ 0.738¡
2 0.574¡ 0.839¡ 1.000¡ i 0.000+ i 0.000+ 0.792¡
3 0.552¡ 0.778¡ i 1.000¡ 0.000+ i 0.000+ 0.000+
4 0.750+ 0.613¡ 0.000+ 0.729¡ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.689¡
5 0.027+ 0.067+ 0.092+ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.120+
6 0.011+ 0.000+ 0.731+ 0.819+ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.000+
7 0.079+ 0.001+ 0.231¡ 0.162+ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.004+
8 0.119+ 0.000+ 0.120+ 0.750¡ 0.000+ 0.453+ 0.021+ 0.003+
9 0.004+ 0.000+ 0.446+ 0.040+ 0.001+ 0.001+ 0.027+ 0.035+
10 0.006+ 0.000+ 0.072+ 0.027+ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.059+ 0.102¡
11 0.005+ 0.000+ 0.490+ 0.003+ 0.000+ 0.103+ 0.004+ 0.806¡
12 0.120+ 0.000+ 0.031+ 0.021+ 0.000+ 0.012+ 0.024+ 0.380+
13 0.003+ 0.001+ 0.000+ 0.016+ 0.000+ 0.061+ 0.613¡ 0.000+
14 0.000+ 0.001+ 0.004+ 0.010+ 0.000+ 0.005+ 0.188+ 0.579+
15 0.001+ 0.001+ 0.031+ 0.673¡ 0.000+ 0.001+ 0.236+ 0.100+
16 0.001+ 0.143+ 0.077+ 0.301+ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.840¡ 0.096+
17 0.000+ 0.105+ 0.057+ 0.059+ 0.000+ 0.021+ 0.704+ 0.109+
18 0.013+ 0.017+ 0.001+ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.086+ 0.000+ 0.004+
19 0.565+ 0.094+ 0.000+ 0.028+ 0.000+ 0.003+ 0.052+ 0.150+
20 0.743¡ 0.067+ 0.000+ 0.011+ 0.008+ 0.118+ 0.457+ 0.061+
21 0.085¡ 0.157+ 0.000+ 0.002+ 0.016+ 0.004+ 0.000+ 0.000+
22 0.741¡ 0.001+ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.000+
23 0.335¡ 0.138+ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.000+
Notes: i) Insu¢cient or no variation in data. The number of observations is 511 for
1984 and 516 for 1993. +=¡ indicates the sign of the dependence as measured
by gamma (see Goodman and Kruskal, 1954, and StataCorp., 1999).
21Table 5: P-values from Pearson’s test of independence in spouses’ instantaneous timing, the
treatment group
N H L S
Hour after
midnight
1984 1993 1984 1993 1984 1993 1984 1993
0 i 0.811¡ i 0.911¡ 0.000+ 0.763¡ 0.000+ 0.756¡
1 i 0.911¡ i i 0.000+ 0.891¡ 0.000+ 0.891¡
2 i 0.937¡ i i 0.000+ i 0.007+ 0.911¡
3 i 0.911¡ i 0.000¡ 0.000+ i 0.007+ 0.000+
4 0.820¡ 0.800¡ 0.000+ 0.821+ 0.007+ 0.000+ 0.014+ 0.821¡
5 0.528¡ 0.409¡ 0.055+ 0.255+ 0.000+ 0.030+ 0.126+ 0.012+
6 0.280+ 0.018+ 0.755+ 0.164+ 0.008+ 0.002+ 0.063+ 0.058+
7 0.256+ 0.017+ 0.383¡ 0.141+ 0.005+ 0.020+ 0.188+ 0.132+
8 0.527+ 0.004+ 0.611+ 0.640+ 0.041+ 0.599+ 0.177+ 0.051+
9 0.352+ 0.004+ 0.259¡ 0.058+ 0.195+ 0.370+ 0.433+ 0.002+
10 0.275+ 0.004+ 0.748¡ 0.081+ 0.028+ 0.185+ 0.292+ 0.185¡
11 0.127+ 0.002+ 0.726+ 0.003+ 0.000+ 0.045+ 0.240+ 0.591+
12 0.339+ 0.000+ 0.244+ 0.009+ 0.004+ 0.050+ 0.018+ 0.230+
13 0.085+ 0.000+ 0.141+ 0.192+ 0.007+ 0.060+ 0.569¡ 0.000+
14 0.136+ 0.000+ 0.479+ 0.133+ 0.034+ 0.001+ 0.165+ 0.945+
15 0.096+ 0.000+ 0.358+ 0.053+ 0.037+ 0.001+ 0.495¡ 0.557+
16 0.007+ 0.135+ 0.151+ 0.226+ 0.004+ 0.004+ 0.317¡ 0.414+
17 0.000+ 0.096+ 0.055+ 0.123+ 0.127+ 0.968+ 0.638+ 0.310+
18 0.133+ 0.254+ 0.078+ 0.189+ 0.013+ 0.211+ 0.000+ 0.310+
19 0.820¡ 0.638+ 0.001+ 0.236+ 0.013+ 0.255+ 0.272+ 0.159+
20 0.821+ 0.488+ 0.534+ 0.174+ 0.130+ 0.170+ 0.475+ 0.488+
21 0.459¡ 0.869+ 0.025+ 0.000+ 0.384+ 0.127+ 0.066+ 0.000+
22 i 0.624¡ 0.000+ 0.005+ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.000+
23 i 0.673¡ 0.001+ 0.060+ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.000+
Notes: see Table 4. The number of observations is
103 for 1984 and 163 for 1993.
22Table 6: P-values from Pearson’s test of independence in spouses’ instantaneous timing, the
control group
N H L S
Hour after
midnight
1984 1993 1984 1993 1984 1993 1984 1993
0 0.862¡ 0.026+ i i 0.479+ 0.223¡ 0.090+ 0.166¡
1 0.862¡ 0.719¡ i i 0.610¡ 0.583¡ 0.295+ 0.435¡
2 0.862¡ 0.719¡ i 0.937¡ 0.803¡ i 0.026+ 0.583¡
3 0.000+ 0.719¡ i 0.937¡ 0.774¡ 0.891¡ 0.007+ 0.668¡
4 0.000+ 0.022+ 0.803¡ 0.756¡ 0.662¡ 0.692¡ 0.000+ 0.645¡
5 0.273+ 0.807+ 0.734¡ 0.970+ 0.840¡ 0.152+ 0.022+ 0.028+
6 0.279+ 0.296+ 0.746+ 0.489+ 0.914¡ 0.401+ 0.134+ 0.008+
7 0.239+ 0.482+ 0.131+ 0.904+ 0.248+ 0.291¡ 0.508+ 0.808+
8 0.646+ 0.241+ 0.154¡ 0.831¡ 0.287+ 0.435+ 0.639+ 0.520¡
9 0.159+ 0.109+ 0.672¡ 0.146+ 0.075+ 0.615+ 0.177¡ 0.820+
10 0.754+ 0.082+ 0.589+ 0.217¡ 0.075+ 0.697+ 0.749+ 0.977¡
11 0.271+ 0.252+ 0.214+ 0.867+ 0.607+ 0.628+ 0.610¡ 0.300+
12 0.082+ 0.282+ 0.919¡ 0.951¡ 0.519+ 0.320+ 0.569¡ 0.517¡
13 0.355+ 0.107+ 0.711¡ 0.213+ 0.154+ 0.177+ 0.229+ 0.542+
14 0.583+ 0.672+ 0.475+ 0.651¡ 0.542+ 0.866+ 0.361+ 0.844+
15 0.185+ 0.387+ 0.868+ 0.905¡ 0.016+ 0.080+ 0.343¡ 0.502¡
16 0.754¡ 0.830+ 0.588+ 0.521+ 0.828+ 0.496+ 0.937¡ 0.826+
17 0.425+ 0.943+ 0.978¡ 0.473+ 0.568¡ 0.685+ 0.645+ 0.269¡
18 0.945+ 0.854¡ 0.664¡ 0.136+ 0.321¡ 0.100¡ 0.638+ 0.261+
19 0.175¡ 0.318+ 0.987¡ 0.354+ 0.760¡ 0.315+ 0.393¡ 0.574+
20 0.277¡ 0.587¡ 0.139+ 0.195+ 0.171¡ 0.961¡ 0.991+ 0.189¡
21 0.478¡ 0.309¡ 0.265¡ 0.096+ 0.111+ 0.886¡ 0.927+ 0.256¡
22 0.662¡ 0.839+ 0.343¡ 0.200¡ 0.322¡ 0.609+ 0.266¡ 0.490+
23 0.662¡ 0.586¡ 0.682¡ 0.583¡ 0.347+ 0.736+ 0.739+ 0.086¡
Notes: see Table 4. The number of observations is
103 for 1984 and 163 for 1993.
23Table 7: P-values from Pearson’s test of independence in spouses’ instantaneous timing,









N H L S N H L S
0 0.775¡ 0.931¡ 0.000+ 0.002+ 0.048+ i 0.477¡ 0.833¡
1 0.879¡ i 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.684¡ i 0.422¡ 0.967+
2 0.890¡ i 0.000+ 0.002+ 0.684¡ 0.951¡ 0.684¡ 0.378+
3 0.844¡ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.069+ 0.931¡ 0.755¡ 0.172+
4 0.731¡ 0.005+ 0.000+ 0.035+ 0.000+ 0.643¡ 0.546¡ 0.009+
5 0.295¡ 0.082+ 0.000+ 0.004+ 0.485+ 0.785¡ 0.345+ 0.006+
6 0.012+ 0.204+ 0.000+ 0.006+ 0.131+ 0.487+ 0.566+ 0.003+
7 0.007+ 0.555+ 0.000+ 0.027+ 0.158+ 0.390+ 0.878¡ 0.425+
8 0.006+ 0.474+ 0.102+ 0.013+ 0.203+ 0.352¡ 0.200+ 0.805¡
9 0.004+ 0.388+ 0.134+ 0.003+ 0.026+ 0.417+ 0.141+ 0.600¡
10 0.003+ 0.218+ 0.015+ 0.475¡ 0.085+ 0.545¡ 0.168+ 0.773+
11 0.001+ 0.013+ 0.000+ 0.297+ 0.098+ 0.370+ 0.481+ 0.380+
12 0.000+ 0.005+ 0.001+ 0.010+ 0.046+ 0.760¡ 0.237+ 0.475¡
13 0.000+ 0.054+ 0.002+ 0.004+ 0.063+ 0.527+ 0.053+ 0.256+
14 0.000+ 0.112+ 0.000+ 0.464+ 0.490+ 0.999+ 0.691+ 0.589+
15 0.000+ 0.037+ 0.000+ 0.823+ 0.140+ 0.998¡ 0.004+ 0.264¡
16 0.004+ 0.070+ 0.000+ 0.783+ 0.969+ 0.315+ 0.539+ 0.903+
17 0.000+ 0.017+ 0.329+ 0.278+ 0.540+ 0.566+ 0.971¡ 0.544¡
18 0.067+ 0.032+ 0.011+ 0.005+ 0.916¡ 0.324+ 0.058¡ 0.244+
19 0.842+ 0.004+ 0.017+ 0.076+ 0.887¡ 0.434+ 0.585+ 0.982¡
20 0.495+ 0.150+ 0.079+ 0.336+ 0.274¡ 0.054+ 0.330¡ 0.319¡
21 0.733¡ 0.000+ 0.101+ 0.000+ 0.216¡ 0.588+ 0.432+ 0.761¡
22 0.599¡ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.954+ 0.091¡ 0.778¡ 0.881¡
23 0.639¡ 0.001+ 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.484¡ 0.489¡ 0.419+ 0.240¡
Notes: see Table 4. The number of observations is 266.
24One might be concernedthatthe lowsample sizes for the matchedgroups wouldnot cause
enough variation and that the conclusion is therefore predetermined. By pooling 1984 and
1993 andrerunningthe tests of independence, I …nd, however, that Ican reject independence
in market work timing between 9 a.m. and 1 p.m. on the 10 percent level for pseudo couples,
see Table 7. For the subset of matched couples the p-value is even lower during the same
hours. The interpretation is hence that timing is in‡uenced by the general organization of
society since evidently, it also a¤ects singles. Neglecting this may overstate the importance
of intra-household timing dependence.
4.2 The e¤ect of timing adjustment on simultaneity
In this subsection, I will examine if the adjustment of working schedules among couples
has any e¤ect on the outcome of synchronous leisure (broadly de…ned to include household
work). We would expect the treated to have more synchronous leisure and household work
than nontreated. If this is the case, we take this as supporting evidence for Hamermesh’s
(2000) hypothesis.
In order to perform this test, I need to assume that the observed outcome of the control
units is representative for the unobserved outcome of the treated couples if they had not
adjusted timing, conditional on the set of matching variables. I hence assume that real
couples that were matched would behave like the control group of singles in the absence of
timing adjustment. Further, I estimate the e¤ect of timing adjustment as the group average
di¤erence (thus treating the response surfaces as parallel).16
I will aggregate simultaneous time spent in leisure and household work. Let S be the


















16 Let P0 be the population of control units and P1 the population of treatment units. For the expected
value of S in Pi; given the matching variables X; I write ﬁi + Wi (X) ; which often is called the response
surface for S in Pi. If response surfaces are parallel, i.e. W0 (X) = W1 (X) = W (X); the expected treatment
e¤ect is simply the groupwise di¤erence of S (see Rubin, 1979).
25where T = 1440 minutes per day and I [¢] is the indicator function, equal to one if [¢] > 0 and
zero otherwise. This variable ignores simultaneity when one of the spouses was just sleeping
or performing market work.
The …nding is that the subset of matched couples enjoys more synchronous leisure than
do pseudo couples, see Table 8 which shows the outcome with respect to synchronous leisure
for the treated and nontreated. Thus, there seems to be support for the hypothesis that
spouses time their activities within the household to obtain more synchronous leisure. The
gain in synchronous leisure as a result of the timing adjustment is not very large, however.
My estimates suggest that treated couples have about 5.9 hours/day of synchronous leisure
(excluding sleeping, resting, and personal hygiene), while nontreated couples have about 5.2
hours/day of synchronous leisure (1984 and 1993 pooled). By adjusting working schedules
and the timing of leisure and household work, couples hence experience a 12 percent increase
(almost three quarters of an hour) in terms of more time when they can potentially meet
during a normal working day. The e¤ect is essentially the same for 1984 and 1993, and
signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 5 percent level in both years.17
It is noteworthy that pseudo couples obtain so much synchronous leisure. Figure 3 and
Figure 4 show the distributions of S by group. We note that matched couples (middle)
have a thicker right-hand side tail than pseudo couples and more real households enjoy 6-7
hours/day of synchronous leisure than pseudo couples. These distributions hence di¤er in
some respects, but perhaps not as much as one might expect considering that pseudocouples
donot adjust timingwithin thehouseholdat all. Because the matchedsingle male and single
female are completely ignorant of each other’s timing, the interpretation is once more that
the organization of society in general have a great impact on timing.18
17 Part of the di¤erence in synchronous leisure may result from singles performing more household work
than someone living in a couple. In order to control for this in the matching, I tried an alternative set of
matching variables. Here, I also included the total time spent on household work, leisure and sleep on the
day of the interview among the set of matching variables besides the ones already included. The result of
that matching was a somewhat lower estimated timing adjustment e¤ect, as compared to the one presented
in the text, although signi…cantly di¤erent from zero in both years (0.60 [2:65] for 1984 and 0.39 [2:04] for
1993, with paired t-tests in brackets).
18 It is impossible to say how much of the e¤ect can be extrapolated to couples in general. We can,
26Table 8: Estimated treatment e¤ect of timing adjustment on synchronous leisure and house-
hold work (hours/day)
1984 1993 Pooled (a)
Treatment group Mean 5.78 6.00 5.91
(Matched real couples) St.dev of mean 3.63 3.59 3.60
St.err of mean 0.36 0.28 0.22
Control group Mean 4.97 5.38 5.22
(Matched pseudo couples) St.dev of mean 2.75 3.20 3.03
St.err of mean 0.27 0.25 0.19
Di¤erence, ﬁ Mean 0.80 0.62 0.69
St.err of mean 0.27 0.25 0.19
Paired t-test 3.00 (0.003) 2.44 (0.016) 3.70 (0.000)
Observations 103 163 266
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition: Composition e¤ect of ﬁ
Alt. 1 40% 27% 32%
Alt. 2 9% 31% 17%
Note: P-value for two-sided paired t-test in parenthesis. a) Pooling is not
rejected (p-value for H0: same mean over years is 0.629 for treated and
0.289 for controls). The composition e¤ect is estimated in two ways:
Alt. 1) The di¤erence in ¹ x is weighted by the coe¢cient vector of real couples, ^ ﬂ1;






1(¹ x1 ¡ ¹ xm0) + ^ ﬂ
0
1(¹ x1 ¡ ¹ xf0)
i
.
Alt. 2) The di¤erence in ¹ x is weighted by the coe¢cient vector of pseudo couples,






m0(¹ x1 ¡ ¹ xm0) + ^ ﬂ
0
f0(¹ x1¡ ¹ xf0)
i
.
Here ¹ x1;¹ xm0; and ¹ xf0 are the mean vectors (including a constant) of the
subset of matched couples, single men and single women, respectively,
and ^ ﬂ1; ^ ﬂm0; and ^ ﬂf0 are the corresponding estimated coe¢cient vectors































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Hours of synchronous leisure (including household work) for pseudo couples (top
row), the subset of matched couples (middle), and all couples (bottom), 1984 (left) and 1993
(right).





















































































































































































































































































Figure 4: Hours of synchronous leisure (including household work) for pseudo couples (top),
the subset of matched couples (middle), and all couples (bottom), 1984 and 1993 pooled.
29Since the matching is not perfect, some of the observed di¤erence in synchronous leisure
may result from compositional di¤erences between groups. There are some dissimilarities
between treated and controls with respect to covariates (see Section 4). A potential problem
is that matched wives worked somewhat less than matched single women, since this may
result in less synchronous leisure among the control couples. What seems to be an e¤ect of
behavioral di¤erences between groups may insteadbe an e¤ect of di¤erences between groups.
It appears, however, that the compositional di¤erences only explain a fraction of the
observed di¤erence in synchronous leisure (S). Here, we estimated the composition e¤ect by
employing a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (see Blinder, 1973, and Oaxaca, 1973), shown
in the bottom of Table 8.19 The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition can be interpreted as an
evaluation of the matching. With perfect matching, the composition e¤ect (with respect to
matching variables) is zero. It is nonzero if the matchingis imperfect as a result ofdi¤erences
between groups. For 1984, we …nd that between 9 and 40 percent of the total di¤erence in S
can be attributed to di¤erences in covariates, depending on the weighting scheme (see note
in Table 8). In the second year, the composition e¤ect lies somewhere between 27 and 31
percent, depending on the weighting scheme. Hence, the conclusion is that the main part of
the observed di¤erences in S is explained by behavioral di¤erences between groups and not
by imperfect matching.
It might be argued that an alternative explanation for the observed treatment e¤ect is
that couples usually have better jobs and earn higher incomes than singles. Among the
bene…ts usually associated with good positions is a high degree of ‡exible working hours. In
however, note that the outcome of S for the matched samples is not very di¤erent from that for all couples
(shown at the bottom of these …gures).
19 The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition procedure is to …rst estimate regression models for S with matching
variables (and a constant) as explanatory variables separately for each group. The composition e¤ect is esti-
mated by weighting the di¤erence in the mean of the covariates between groups by the estimated coe¢cient
vector belonging to either the …rst or the second group. A standard argument in the literature is that the
true composition e¤ect lies between these two weighting schemes. Note that the matching covariates that are
household-speci…c variables for matched true couples (i.e. the number of children in di¤erent age brackets)
were not restricted in the matching algorithm to be equal for a single man and a single woman matched
together into a pseudo couple. The composition e¤ect presented in the text is the average composition e¤ect
of …rst using the covariates of single males and then the covariates of single females. (The di¤erence in the
resulting composition e¤ect, depending on which covariate vector was used is not very large, however).
30my data, there is a signi…cant di¤erence in the average taxable income for men taken from
the sample of control units and the sample of treatment units (but not for women).20 To
test the hypothesis that income di¤erences (serving as a proxy for labor market position)
explain di¤erences in S; I run separate regressions for the samples by gender and year of
S on the yearly taxable income of each spouse, holding constant for the hours of market
work of each spouse (not shown).21 The only signi…cant e¤ect of yearly taxable income
found was that for single men in 1993. Those single men that earned more relative to other
single men also had working schedules resulting in higher S.22 I …nd no signi…cant e¤ect
of yearly taxable income for the treatment group or for the original sample of all couples.
The income di¤erence between treatment units and control units should therefore result in
a lower estimated treatment e¤ect for high-income males in 1993.23
5 Time jointly with the spouse
Some of the free time that spouses choose to consume simultaneously, they also choose to
spend together. In this section, I will study the actual time that spouses spend with each
other. The analysis in this sectionshould perhaps best be seenas a study of welfare, since we
think that the distribution of well-being depends on to what extent members in a society can
interact and coordinate household work and leisure. These issues are of interest in view of
20 The di¤erence is statistically signi…cant on 5 percent. In 1984, single men in my sample earned about
74,000 SEK on an annual basis, while men in the subset of matched couples earned about 85,000 SEK. For
1993, the relative income di¤erence had increased; single men earned 163,000 SEK on average and men in
the subset of matched couples on average 191,000 SEK.
21 Income might be a bad proxy for the labor market position, considering that there may be a wage
premium in jobs that o¤er less ‡exibility. On the other hand, it may mainly be low productivity individuals
with low wage rates that accept jobs with low work time ‡exibility. Furthermore, income is a mixture of
hours worked and hourly pay. It would be interesting to investigate if there are di¤erences in S with respect
to hourly wage. Regrettably, there are too many missing observations in the hourly wage for singles.
22 The e¤ect is not very large, however. For singles in 1993, the linear estimate on S of an additional
10,000 SEK in yearly taxable income for the single male is 0.066 (t-ratio 3.29), i.e. approximately 4 minutes
(the elasticity with respect to yearly taxable income is estimated to 0.20 percent).
23 I have also tried to include the individual taxable income among my matching variables. The matching
did not result in matched samples of single males and males in couples that were similar in taxable income,
however.
31the changed labor market circumstances, above all the increased labor force participation by
women in the Western World, including Sweden, in the past twenty years. How have these
changes a¤ected the spouses’ capacity to synchronize their working schedules andenjoy more
time together?
As for parents’ time with children (see Hallberg and Klevmarken, 2002), it is reasonable
that the decision to allocate time to the spouse is determined by both investment and con-
sumptionmotives. To my knowledge, however, little or no theoretical results in the literature
suggest how time allocated to the spouse varies with income and hourly wage. Couples that
are economically better o¤ (i.e. have a high income) might buy time with each other since
they can a¤ord certain costly services from the market (e.g., cooking and cleaning). It is
reasonable to believe that highly productive individuals are more adept at planning, coor-
dinating and streamlining their daily life. If there is a preference for togetherness, we might
expect such couples to spend more time with the spouse than others. On the other hand,
high productivity individuals may have a trade-o¤ between many activities and after all, it
is not certain that they spend more time with the spouse than low productivity individuals.
It might even be less. Gronau and Hamermesh (2001) found substantial di¤erences among
households in the variety of nonmarket activities that they produce. By variety in activities,
I mean the degree of variation in both types of activities and the number of activities per-
formed. More educated individuals (who canalsooften be considered to be more productive)
generate more variety, engaging in both additional activities and the same ones as the less
educated.24
It is, however, not certain that such considerations will in‡uence the time-use together
withthe spouse. The event that spouses do spendtime together, given that spouses have the
opportunity to meet, might mainly depend on the extent of intra-household work burden
and the cooperation of the spouses. For instance, parents of small children might prefer
simultaneity but not necessarily togetherness in household work, since they must accommo-
24 This was found by studying activities recorded in time-use data from six countries (Australia, Israel,
the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and West Germany).
32date an explicit child care time constraint. While one spouse concentrate on, e.g., cooking a
meal, the other takes care of the infant. The preference to be together should furthermore
depend on how much spouses enjoy each other’s company.
I will focus my empirical analysis in this section on how much of the potential time – in
either leisure or household work – that spouses can be together (S) is actually also spent
together. Let J denote the time that spouses actually are together. Accordingly, the variable
of interest is J=S:
In the data-set used, the respondent was asked for each activity if someone else was
present. One of the response alternatives was “spouse/common-law husband (wife)”.25
Denote the individual response of total time spent with the spouse during a day by Js;
s = m;f: I de…ne it as the total time during a day of either household work or leisure during
which the spouse was reported present. The times when couples met at work and when the
respondent was either sleeping or resting were excluded from the analysis. Sleep and rest
are ignored to ensure that the two years are comparable.26 Market work is excluded to
ensure consistency with the de…nition of synchronous leisure given in Section 4.2.27
Some assumptions were needed to obtain a household measure of J that is consistent
with the de…nition of S. Because the spouses were interviewed separately 1) Js sometimes
exceeds S; and2) the responses of husband and wife usually di¤er, sometimes considerably.28
25 Other alternatives included being with one’s own or spouse’s/partner’s child, other household members,
other relatives, workmate/colleague, others, and being alone.
26 The original data for 1993 contain some sources of error. An explicit order was given to interviewers
not to inquire about other persons being present during the activity sleep and rest. This order was followed
in 1984, but not strictly in 1993.
27 Some couples meet at work, either because they work at the same place or because they work close to
or actually in their homes (e.g. farmers), but these fractions are quite low. Neglecting time together during
market work should not change the analysis in a signi…cant way. About 85 percent report zero time and
the average time for nonzero values is less than 1.3 hours per day in the whole sample of couples (pooling
gender and years).
33;29 I will assume that the time that a respondent stated that he or she was together with
the spouse is bounded by the time that the two spouses can potentially be together (i.e. by
S). I de…ne the household measure of actual time that spouses were together as the average





Somewhat more than half the potential time (64 percent) was spent with the spouse. On
average, spouses spent approximately 3.6 hours ofa normal workday in eachother’s company
out of 5.6 hours of simultaneous leisure and household work. This refers to the full sample
of two-earner households, both years pooled. There is a small di¤erence in means between
years, but this is not signi…cant. Only for very few households is J zero (31 observations in
1984 and 17 in 1993).
The relationship that we will estimate is given by
J=S = ﬁ+ ¯
0x +" (5)
where ﬁ and ﬂ are parameters and " is an error component. As explanatory variables I
consider the husband’s age, the age structure of the children, education (years of schooling
and a dummy for university diploma), hourly wage rates net of taxes and incomes of the
spouses.30 The division between market and nonmarket time may be more confusing for
the self-employed than for others. I therefore also control for self-employment.
There might be interesting e¤ects of economic variables on time together as suggested
above. By including income and wage rates as explanatory variables, I test if couples’
28 Js can exceed S if the respondent reported leisure or household work and stated that the spouse was
present while the spouse reported market work or sleep – in which case the presence of the respondent is
ignored – or reported leisure or household work but forgot that the respondent was actually present.
29 In this respect, the disagreement between the husband’s and the wife’s response (total per day with
the spouse in leisure or household work) is somewhat higher in 1993, as compared to 1984. An explanation
for this might be that the design of the forms was changed between these years. The 1984 survey permit-
ted combinations of two types of persons being present during an activity (spouse, child, other household
members, work colleague, and others) and the 1993 survey permitted combinations of six types of persons:
30 For simplicity, I will assume that the hourly wage rate after tax is exogenous. Income is taxable income
measured on a yearly basis.
34economic possibilities have any direct e¤ect on J=S. A recurrent suggestion in the literature
is that individuals that are highly productive on the market also are highly productive at
home. I will use the wage rate as a proxy for productivity. (Education may also capture
this e¤ect since it can be seen as a proxy for productivity too.)
Regression estimates of (5) are presented in Table 9 and Table 10 for 1984 and 1993,
respectively. The estimation sample is the Monday-Friday responses from the whole sample
of two-earner households.31 The husband’s age is included as …ve dummy variables in 5
and 10-year age intervals with the reference category being 41-50 years of age. There are
clearly systematical di¤erences between families in how much time spouses spend together.
We …nd that couples with small children and older couples consume signi…cantly less time
together than others. Young couples in their late 20s or early 30s without children spend
most time together. In relation to the e¤ect of children, however, the age e¤ects dominate
in size. However, the di¤erences due to both age and children are smaller in the 1990s than
in the 1980s.
There is also some weak support in the results that those with more years of schooling
allocate less time to the spouse than others. Considering that education might function
as a proxy for productivity, this e¤ect might hence lend itself to an interpretation similar
to that of Gronau and Hamermesh (2001). High productivity individuals more often have
more activities from which to choose than other and evidently this decreases the time with
the spouse. The e¤ect is small, however, and only signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 5
percent level in one ofthe three speci…cations for 1993, and at the 10 percent level in another
speci…cation for 1984. We …nd a negative e¤ect from the hourly wage rate of the husband in
1993, although signi…cant only at the 10 percent level. Education variables are insigni…cant
in that speci…cation, which suggests that both the wage rate and the education variables
seem to capture productivity to some extent. There is, however, no signi…cant e¤ect from
the hourly wage rate in 1984. Perhaps most of the expected e¤ect of the wage variable is
31 The dependent variable is bounded between 0 and 1, but J=S is 0 (1) only for about 3 percent (about
10 percent). Tobit estimates (and t-statistics) are very similar to the OLS estimates presented in the text.
35Table 9: OLS estimates of the time with the spouse in relation to synchronous leisure and
household work (J/S), 1984. (Full sample of two-earner households, Mon.-Fri.)
(1) (2) (3)
J=S J=S J=S
#children 0-2 -0.03 (-0.69) -0.04 (-0.77) -0.04 (-0.98)
#children 3-6 -0.08 (-2.79)*** -0.08 (-2.57)** -0.10 (-3.23)***
#children 7-12 -0.01 (-0.48) -0.02 (-0.82) -0.01 (-0.50)
#children 13-18 0.01 (0.22) 0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (-0.05)
agem 18-25 0.17 (2.33)** 0.16 (1.82)* 0.18 (2.37)**
agem 26-30 0.17 (2.87)*** 0.18 (2.97)*** 0.20 (3.40)***
agem 31-40 0.09 (2.16)** 0.11 (2.25)** 0.10 (2.55)**
agem 51-60 0.07 (1.78)* 0.07 (1.52) 0.04 (1.00)
agem 61- 0.08 (1.31) 0.08 (1.01) 0.04 (0.69)
schoolingm 0.00 (0.70) 0.00 (0.79) -0.00 (-0.39)
schoolingf -0.01 (-1.83)* -0.01 (-1.20) -0.01 (-1.30)
universitym -0.08 (-1.55) -0.08 (-1.37) -0.08 (-1.59)
universityf 0.06 (1.12) 0.05 (0.79) 0.06 (1.06)
self-employedm 0.03 (0.92) -0.06 (-0.88) 0.05 (1.29)









Constant 0.68 (10.97)*** 0.74 (7.26)*** 0.66 (9.69)***
Observations 497 369 466
R2 0.06 0.08 0.08
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** signi…cant
at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. W is the hourly wage rate
after tax. Y is the yearly taxable income.
36Table 10: OLS estimates of the time with the spouse in relation to synchronous leisure and
household work (J/S), 1993. (Full sample of two-earner households, Mon.-Fri.)
(1) (2) (3)
J=S J=S J=S
#children 0-2 -0.05 (-1.06) -0.08 (-1.25) -0.04 (-0.77)
#children 3-6 -0.04 (-1.52) -0.06 (-1.72)* -0.04 (-1.20)
#children 7-12 -0.05 (-2.28)** -0.06 (-2.30)** -0.04 (-1.76)*
#children 13-18 -0.01 (-0.60) -0.04 (-1.85)* -0.01 (-0.48)
agem 18-25 -0.06 (-0.69) -0.11 (-1.00) -0.03 (-0.32)
agem 26-30 0.04 (0.74) 0.02 (0.34) 0.08 (1.51)
agem 31-40 0.07 (1.71)* 0.10 (2.50)** 0.09 (2.10)**
agem 51-60 -0.06 (-1.81)* -0.09 (-2.25)** -0.05 (-1.45)
agem 61- -0.03 (-0.67) -0.08 (-1.15) -0.02 (-0.42)
schoolingm -0.01 (-1.19) -0.00 (-0.04) -0.01 (-2.03)**
schoolingf 0.00 (0.73) 0.00 (0.50) 0.00 (0.37)
universitym 0.04 (0.98) 0.02 (0.37) 0.05 (1.04)
universityf -0.05 (-1.39) -0.07 (-1.51) -0.06 (-1.50)
self-employedm 0.08 (2.36)** 0.06 (0.97) 0.12 (3.13)***









Constant 0.72 (9.15)*** 0.70 (6.99)*** 0.65 (7.63)***
Observations 508 372 454
R2 0.05 0.07 0.06
Note: See Table 9.
37captured by education.32
The results also suggest that a couple with high incomes in 1993 spent more time of S
together than those with low incomes. If translating these e¤ects into elasticities, we can
conclude that a 10 percent higher income of one of the spouses is coupled with a 1 percent
increase in togetherness at a given level of synchronous leisure and household work. The
null that the e¤ect on J=S of the husband’s income and the wife’s income are equal is not
rejected by an F-test, which suggests that the source of income is of no importance in this
case. One interpretation of this e¤ect could be that high-income couples choose to buy
costly market services that free time for togetherness. In 1984, the e¤ect of the husband’s
individual incomewas positive and signi…cant, but only at the 10 percent level. This, andthe
result that the point estimate of the wife’s income in 1984 is negative, although insigni…cant,
suggests that the income e¤ect for 1993 should be interpreted with great caution. Finally,
we note that the presented regression estimates explain only a small fraction of the total
variation in the dependent variable.
6 Summary and concluding remarks
This paper examines the temporal choices of time-use and the time spouses spend together.
As suggested by Hamermesh (2000), it is plausible to think that couples seek to maximize
their joint time. Thus, couples must constantly adjust the timing of their activities to one
another, especially market work.
Swedish time budget data from 1984 and 1993 are used to study this issue. The results
give empirical support for the timing of spouses being strongly dependent between spouses.
If one of the spouses performs market work in a daytime hour, the other spouse it is more
likely to also do this than not. Spouses also organize the timing of leisure so that it is
enjoyed at the same time. Timing dependence is less frequent in household work and sleep
32 Because there is a compression in the after tax wage rate introduced by the progressiveness in the
tax system, one might consider using the before-tax wage rate instead, since it better captures individual
productivity. However, alternative speci…cations with the gross wage rate did not result in signi…cant e¤ects
either.
38as compared to leisure, however.
I perform a matching experiment using a sample of singles as a control group for a sample
of true couples, to assess the e¤ect of spouses’ timing coordination. I show that the observed
outcome in timing is, to some extent, a result of the proposed coordination in timing and
to some extent a result of the general organization of society. The results suggest that by
coordinating work and leisure hours, couples obtain about 12 percent (three quarters of an
hour) additional synchronous leisure than would otherwise have been the case. The e¤ect
of coordination is hence not very large, although statistically signi…cant, and essentially the
same during the whole study period.
The data set used in this paper allows for a distinction between simultaneous time-use of
the spouses and the actual time that spouses meet. I …nd that the time that spouses spend
together, conditional on the time that spouses can potentially meet, depends negatively
on the presence of small children. Togetherness is low among older couples as compared
to younger couples. We also …nd some support for the hypothesis that more educated
individuals allocate less time to their spouse than those who are less educated. This e¤ect is
weak and only marginally signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, however. Furthermore, there are
some indications that, at least in the 1990s, high-income spouses spent more time together,
given the potential time that they could meet. One interpretation might be that couples
that are economically better o¤ are able to buy costly market services that free time for
togetherness.
Traditional models of time-use usually overlook the timing aspect of time-use. The main
conclusion of the …ndings in this paper is therefore that traditional models potentially miss
a vital part of behavior. Individuals’ use of time should not in general be summarized over
a long period of time and then studied as an aggregate. The …nding that timing is essential
for individual behavior implies that a reasonable micro-economic model of time-use should
also incorporate this dimension, or at least test whether or not the timing mechanism is of
importance.
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417 Appendix
The algorithm below will simultaneously match a single male to a single woman with a
pseudo couple and this pseudo couple to a real couple (”double matching”). The matching
obtains a control group of pseudo couples M0 and a treatment group of real couples M1.
The matching is made without replacement. The matching technique is outlined in Rubin
(1979). Denote the random samples of single males and single females by G0m and G0f;
with sample sizes N0m and N0f; respectively. Let G1 be the sample of true couples with
sample size N1. Denote the sorted samples of males in a couple and females in a couple
by G1m and G1f, respectively. Here N0m < N1; and N0f < N1: Since matching is made
without replacement, the matched samples M0 and M1 will each consist of min(N0m;N0f)
observations. Consider a set of k matching variables for each individual in each sample,
denoted xqsj; where q indexes single samples (0) or couple samples (1), s indexes male (m)
or female (f) and j = 1;:::;Nqs indexes observation. First estimate the pooled within-sample
covariance matrix of X based on the random samples G0s and G1s; i.e.
zs = [(X0
0sX0s ¡ N0s¹ x0
0s¹ x0s)+ (X0
1sX1s ¡ N1s¹ x0
1s¹ x1s)](N0s +N1 ¡ 2)
¡1;s = m;f;
where Xms is the Nqs £ k data matrix of X in Gqs and ¹ xqs is 1 £ k sample mean vector.
Second, sort the sample of single males (G0m) randomly. Then, proceed with the following
matching algorithm:
(1) Take single male g in G0m and compute for every j = 1;:::;N0f; and i = 1;::::;N1;
Vji = (x0mg ¡ x1mi)z¡1
m (x0mg ¡ x1mi)
0 + (x0fj ¡ x1fi)z¡1
f (x0fj ¡ x1fi)
0:
Each term in Vji is the Mahalanobis metric – the distance between a G0s unit with score x0s
and a G1s unit with score x1s – for the male (s = m) and the female (s = f).
(2) The best matching for the single male g is the combination of j and i with the lowest






(3) Take the next single male and repeat steps 1 and 2 until G0m or G0f are empty.
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